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Plaintiff,
vs.
ELLEN K. DASKALAS, individual, d/b/a THE PAWN SHOP, a
Utah corporation; and TERRY
PENTELAKIS, an individual,
d/b/a AAA JEWELERS & LOANS,

Case No.

880302-CA

Case No.

880292-CA

Defendants and
Appellants,
and
JUANITA IRENE BURGE; ROBERT D,
BARROWS, JR.; BEATRICE IRENE
BARROWS, et al.,
Defendants and
Respondents.
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT
LAKE CITY, a public entity,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.
JUANITA IRENE BURGE; ROBERT D.
BARROWS, JR.; BEATRICE IRENE
BARROWS; ELLEN K. DASKALAS, an
individual, d/b/a THE PAWN SHOP
THE PAWN SHOP, a Utah corporation; JAMES ANDERSON, an individual d/b/a JIM'S RIBS;
TERRY PENTELAKIS, an individual
d/b/a AAA JEWELERS & LOANS AND
INC., a Utah corporation,
Defendants and
Appellants.
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JUANITA IRENE BURGE; ROBERT
D. BARROWS, JR.; BEATRICE
IRENE BARROWS; ELLEN K.
DASKALAS, an individual,
d/b/a THE PAWN SHOP; THE
PAWN SHOP, a Utah corporation; JAMES ANDERSON, an
individual d/b/a JIM'S RIBS;
TERRY PENTELAKIS, an individual, d/b/a AAA JEWELERS;
and LOANS AND SALES, INC.,
a Utah corporation,

Case No.

880292-CA

Defendants and
Appellants.
PETITION FOR REHEARING
The Defendants/Appellants Ellen K. Daskalas, individually
and d/b/a The Pawn Shop, Terry Pentelakis, individually and d/b/a
AAA Jewelers & Loans, by and through their attorneys of record,
Brant H. Wall and Jerome H. Mooney, III, hereby petition the Court
for a rehearing with reference to the Opinion of the Court filed on
October 11, 1989, as to issues II and IV, and the related issues
pertaining to the tenants leasehold interests and attorney's fees.
POINT I
THE COURT HAS FAILED TO PROPERLY APPLY THE
PREVAILING LAW AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS WITH
REFERENCE TO THE "DATE OF TAKING".
It is necessary to orderly proceedings in condemnation that
a date be fixed for determining the value of the estates to be
taken during the proceeding.

78-34-11 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as

amended, establishes that date as "the date of the service of
summons. . ." and specifically provides:
"For the purpose of assessing compensation and damages, the
right thereto shall be deemed to have accrued at the date
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of the service of summons, and its actual value at that
date shall be the measure of compensation for all property
to be actually taken, and the basis of damages to property
not actually taken, but injuriously affected, in all cases
where such damages are allowed, as provided in the next
preceding section [§ 78-34-10]. No improvements put upon
the property subsequent to the date of service of summons
shall be included in the assessment of compensation or
damages. " (Emphasis added.)
In construing this statute, the Utah Supreme Court, in a
long series of cases, has consistently and repeatedly held that the
date of taking and the value of damages should be measured as of
the time of the service of summons.

See:

State v. District Court,

Fourth Judicial District, 78 P2d 502 at 506; Hyde Park Town v.
Chambers, 104 P2d 220; State v. Cooperative Security Corporation of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 247 P2d 269; State
v. Jacobs, 397 P2d 463; State, ex rel Road Commission v. Wood, 452
P2d 872; Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Ward, 347 P2d
862; Redevelopment Agency v. Mitsui Investment, Inc., 522 P2d 1370.
We invite the Court's attention to the case of Moyle v.
Salt Lake City, 176 P2d 882, where it is stated:
"It is elemental in eminent domain cases, that the owner is
entitled to the value of the property for the highest and
best use to which it could be put at the time of the
taking, and is not limited to the use then actually made of
it."
In the case of State v. Cooperative Security Corporation of the
Church, supra, our Supreme Court, citing the provision of 104-61-12
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, stated:
"'For the purpose of assessing compensation and damages the
right thereto shall be deemed to have accrued at the date
of the service of summons, and its actual value at that
date shall be the measure of compensation for all property
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to be actually taken, and the basis of damages to property
not actually taken, but injuriously affected, * * *'
(Emphasis ours.)" (Emphasis added.)
In State v. Jacobs, supra, the Court stated:
"The owner of the property under condemnation is entitled
to a value based upon the highest and best use to which it
could be put at the time of the taking, without limitation
as to the use then actually made of it."
In Redevelopment Agency v. Mitsui, supra, our Supreme Court again
held as follows:
"The trial court's ruling was consistent with that purpose
and with the general rule; That the value of condemned
property is to be determined as of the date and under the
circumstances existing at the time of the taking; * * *"
One of the major problems we have with the Court's ruling
stems from that portion of the Opinion of this Court set forth on
Page 14, which states:
"The time of the taking is generally considered to be the
time at which the condemning authority actually takes
possession of the property, not the time at which the
initial complaint is served." (Citing the case of Phillips
Petroleum Co., 468 P2d at 99.)
We respectfully submit that reliance upon Phillips for the
above position is misplaced.

A careful reading of the Phillips

case clearly states that the date for determination of compensation
is the date of taking.

Nowhere in the Phillips case do we find

the language suggested by this Court in its Opinion hereinabove
quoted.
As we read the Phillips case, it is not inconsistent with
the Utah law and an analysis of the facts in said case discloses
that the parties agreed that the date of "taking" was March 9,
1966, id. at 97, and not the date of possession by the condemning
authority which occurred subsequent to the March 9, 1966, date.
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In Phillips, much as in the instant case, possession of the
property did not change until subsequent to the taking date, as the
tenant continued in possession from March 9, 1966, until April 25,
1966, id, at 101.

It is also clear that the tenants in the

Phillips case continued to pay rent to the original property owner
through September of 1966, Id, at 101,

Thus, under any doctrine

established in Phillips, the date of taking is not the date of
possession by the condemning agency as held by this Court in its
Opinion

dated

October

11,

1989.

Given

this

analysis, we

respectfully submit that the Court has erred in its interpretation
of the Phillips case and the applicable law.
In the Opinion rendered by this Court, it is not stated
that

it is the intention

pre-existing

of the Court to overrule or modify

law or place a different
of

78-34-11

Utah

interpretation
Code

upon the

statutory

provision

Annotated, 1953 as

amended.

The law seems so well settled on this issue that we

respectfully submit that the Kansas case of Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Bradley is not controlling, and does not reverse or override the
rule of law announced by our Supreme Court.
If the rights of the tenant in this action became fixed as
of the date of "taking" (issuance of summons) as we believe the law
to be, then, and

in that event, whatever

value the existing

leasehold interests had were fixed as of that date.
The tenants, under the cases and authorities cited, were
entitled to file their responsive pleadings to the complaint in
condemnation, and further, as a matter of law and of constitutional
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right, were entitled to have their respective property interests
appraised and demonstrate whether or not a "bonus factor" existed
with

reference

being

to their

respective leasehold

interests without

in violation of any provision of their respective lease

agreements.

The tenants should be entitled to submit to the fact

finder a complete and total analysis of the value ascribed by
expert appraisers to the existing leasehold interests, including
the option to renew provision contained therein.
Of

particular

import, we

wish

to

invite

the

Court's

attention to the case decided by the United States Supreme Court,
which we believe to be directly in point with one of the critical
issues here involved.

In the case of Almota Farmers Elevator &

Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 35 L.Ed 2d 1, 93 S.
Ct 791, the government had instituted proceedings to condemn a
leasehold interest which at the time of the commencement of the
action

had

a

seven

and

one-half

year

period

remaining

contained an option to renew the lease for an additional term.
the time of

the taking, the property

thereon by the tenant.

had

and
At

improvements placed

The tenant contended that in determining

the value of its leasehold interest, they were entitled to include
a consideration of the possible renewal of the lease.

The Federal

District Court accepted the lessees contention and on appeal to the
9th Circuit Court, the ruling of the District Court was reversed.
The United States Supreme Court accepted certiorari and
reversed the Court of Appeals judgment, and in so doing, held that
under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the
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lessee was entitled to have all of the improvements assessed at
their value over their useful life without regard to the term of
the leasef taking into account the possibility that the lease might
be renewed as well as the possibility that it might notf and that
it

was

improper

improvements

only

to
over

limit
the

compensation
remaining

to

lease

the
term,

use

of

since

the
such

limitation failed to award what a willing buyer would have paid for
the lease with the improvements in view of the possibility of
renewal.
In the instant case, the tenants had made improvements upon
the subject property which were to be compensated
process of the condemnation.

for in the

However, the trial court concluded

that the value of the improvements would be the total extent of any
compensation which the tenants would be entitled to share in.
Thus, the trial court diminished the total leasehold interest and
property right taken by the power of eminent domain.
On the date of service of summons, the leasehold agreements
then in existence had approximately 13 months of unexpired term,
plus an option to renew with no indication as to if, as, or when an
order of occupancy would be granted.

At that point in time, there

occurred a taking within the constitutional sense, and the tenants
were entitled, and were entirely warranted, in asserting their
claim to damage without the threat or expectancy that they would be
penalized for so doing by the assessment of attorney's fees against
them.
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At

the

time

of

the

filing

of

the

answer

bv

these

Defendants/Appellants, material issues of fact existed relative to
the damages, if any, which said tenants were entitled to receive,
and consequently, the filing of the answer was not unwarranted but
required to avoid a default iudgment being entered against them.
POINT II
THE GRANTING OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IN FAVOR OF OWNERS
IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
The only basis for the granting of attornev's fees is if
the tenants were unwarranted in asserting their claims to share in
any damage award, and only then, if there exists a contractual
basis for such.
Based upon the record, there can be no disoute that:
A)

On the date of taking, the leasehold interests were in

effect, and;
B)

Each leasehold interest had a remaininq period of time?

and,
C)

Each leasehold interest contained an option to renew.

The authorities cited under Point I clearlv support the
rights

of

the

tenants

to

file

a

responsive

pleading

without

violating any provision of their lease.
The rights of the parties being "fixed" as of the date of
taking, a full and complete evidentiary trial should have been
accorded tenants to present evidence as to the fair market value
of the existing leasehold interests.

See:

& Warehouse Co. v. United States, supra.

Almota Farmers Elevator
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The proceedings conducted by the owners in contesting the
rights of the tenants were not only contrary to the contractual
rights

of

the

parties,

but

were

totally

unwarranted

and

unnecessary.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the authorities cited clearly
support

the tenants1

position

that on the date of service of

summons, they were in possession of a compensable interest in the
property condemned and entitled to assert their claim for damages
as may be determined upon a full evidentiary hearing.
To assess attorney's fees against the tenants for filing a
responsive pleading to the Complaint is without support in law or
in fact and penalizes said parties for exercising a legal right.
We believe the law recognizes the right of any owner of real
property to challenge the amount of just compensation to be awarded
in any condemnation proceeding and find no basis for the assessment
of

attorney's

fees against

the owner

of an

interest

in real

property should he fail to convince the triers of fact that the
damages sustained do not exceed the sum offered by or alleged to be
"just compensation" by the condemning authority.

To hold that the

tenants are liable to the owners for their attorney's fees in
contesting the right of the tenants to share in the award would be
no different than assessing attorney's fees against the owners and
in favor of the condemning authority should they fail to prevail in
their challenge of the amount to be awarded by the condemning
authority.
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If the filing of the condemnation action did not terminate
the tenants1 rights to assert their claim to share in the award,
then there exists no basis for the assessment of attorney's fees
against the tenants and in favor of the owners.
We respectfully urge the Court to reconsider the issues
involved herein and apply what we believe to be the correct rule
of law: i.e., on the date of taking the tenants were the owners of
a compensable property right which had been taken by the filing of
the action and service of summons and that it was not improper for
the tenants to pursue their constitutional and legal rights to seek
a

determination

of

the

nature

and

extent

of

the

compensable

interest, if any, by the triers of fact.
DATED this

/

day of November^l989.

Lx&Pfift B.' WALL
Aj^tforney for Defendants/Appellants
Daskalas and Pentelakis

JL
:. MO0NEY,
MO^NEY, III
i:
JEROME H.
Attorney for Defendant^Appellants
Daskalas and Pentelakis

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
p

This is to certify that # true and correct copy of the

foregoing Petition for Rehearing was mailed, postage prepaid, to
the following named persons this ^7la. day of November, 1989:
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JOHN T. EVANS
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING
Attorney at Law
310 South Main, #1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
HAROLD A. HINTZE
OLSEN, HINTZE, NELSON & HILL
Attorneys at Law
3319 No. University Ave. #200
Provo, Utah 84604
WILLIAM D. OSWALD
Attorney at Law
57 West 200 South, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
B. RAY ZOLL
Attorney at Law
5251 South Green St., #205
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123

rretary to Brant H. V
I hereby certify that the foregoing petition is in good
faith and not for delay.
DATED this 9th day of November, 1989.
WALL & WALL

BlTAJrt?

H. WALL
A£tor
orney for Defendants/Appellants
Daskalas and Pentelakis

